In the following paper we analyze the strategic competition between fast and slow traders. A High Frequency Trader (HFT) is defined as a trader that has the ability to react to information faster than other informed traders and as a consequence can trade more than other traders. This trader benefits from low latency compared to slower trader. In such a setting, we prove the existence and the unicity of an equilibrium with fast and slow traders. We find that the speed advantage of HFTs has a beneficial effect on market liquidity as well as price efficiency. The positive effect on liquidity is present only if there are 2 or more HFTs. However, despite those effects slower traders are at a disadvantage as they are not able to trade on their private information as many times as their HFTs counterpart. Once they can most of their private information has been incorporated into prices due to the lower latency of HFTs. This implies that slower traders are worse off when HFTs are present. The speed differential benefits HFTs as they earn higher expected profits than their slower counterparts and also benefits liquidity traders. We find the existence of an optimal level of speed for HFT.
Introduction
The last two decades have seen the explosion of computerized trading. High Frequency Trading (HFT) is only one aspect of computerized or algorithmic trading. 1 A definition of HFT is quite complex and can be given by describing its properties such as proprietary trading, very short holding periods, submission of a large number of orders that are rapidly cancelled, flat position at the end of the trading day, low margin per trade and the use of co-location services (see Gomber et al. (2011) ). According to the literature focusing on the US markets, between 40% and 70% of the trading volume in the US equity markets stems directly from HFT (see Biais and Woolley (2011) ). The European and Asian-Pacific markets are slightly less exposed to HFT as 38% (for the European markets) and between 10%-30% (for the Asian-Pacific markets) of the traded volume is attributed to HFT. This phenomenon has initially been concentrated in equity markets. However, it has expanded beyond equity markets to other markets and to other asset classes such as fixed income markets, FX markets and futures markets. 2 This has been a result of the intense competition between HFTs on the equity markets and the desire to maintain a certain level of profits. HFT is now a feature of many markets. Some researchers see it as a permanent phenomenon with a temporary effect. In the same way as the introduction of telegraph, telephone and then computers gave a speed advantage to its early adopters that then disappeared as more and more traders adopted the new technology. Overall, the profit of HFTs is declining as a result of more and more HFTs being active in the different markets. However, due to its growth and presence in many markets, researchers have become more interested in HFT and have tried to assess its impact on markets. According to O'Hara (2015) more research both empirical and theoretical on HFT is still needed. This relatively new phenomenon (Algorithmic Trading) has also been the focus of the popular business press with an overwhelmingly negative view (see for instance Lewis (2014) , Baer and Patterson (2014) and Lopez (2014) ).
HFT offers different challenges such as measuring it and then assessing its impact on financial markets. When quantifying HFT the lack of a unique workable empirical definition proves to be problematic and two different approaches are used: a direct and an indirect one. None of the two approaches can correctly measure the activity stemming from HFT and this leads to different activity measures. The direct approach identifies HFT firms by their primary business and the types of algorithms they use whereas the indirect approach is based on the lifetime and the number of orders. The former possibly leads to a lower bound of the measure as some other financial institutions may engage in HFT and the latter an upper bound. Using the two above 1 As algorithmic trading (AT) is still a relatively new phenomenon a definition is slowly emerging. Prix et al. (2007) describes it as computerized trading controlled by algorithms without any human interventions. A more precise definition is given by Kirilenko and Lo (2013) as being "the use of mathematical models, computers, and telecommunication networks to automate the buying and selling of financial securities".
2 Increased turnover in FX market has been found (increase of $657 billion from April 2007 to April 2010) and HFT has been indirectly linked to that increase (see the BIS Triennal Survey).
approaches, Bouveret et al. (2014) finds that between 24% and 76% of the activity is linked to HFT. The research studies 100 stocks from nine European countries.
In the present paper, we analyze HFT in a theoretical model. Our definition of a fast trader (HFT) is straightforward and refers to a trader that can react to information faster than other informed traders and as a consequence can trade more than other traders. This trader benefits from low latency where low latency refers to the time it takes a trader to reacts to new information. Comparatively, a slow trader receives private and public information but needs time to process information and then to trade on it. Once the slow trader trades the fast trader has potentially traded several times (the number of times depends on the speed) and the slow trader is unable to trade on the information revealed by the HFT. We capture that difference between HFT and slow traders. The model analyzed is based on Kyle (1985) and we modify this model to allow for different speeds for traders. As a consequence, we are able to analyze the effect of differing traders' speed in a Kyle (1985) framework. We also can analyze the competition between HFTs. Following empirical findings, we assume that HFTs are informed (see Biais and Foucault (2014) and Biais et al. (2015) for instance). We study the effect of speed differential between traders onto different market measures.
The critical aspect for HFTs to realize gains and therefore keep their comparative advantage is to be able to trade fast and achieve low latency. This is obtained by substantial investment in infrastructure and also by the co-location of HFT's computers at the exchange. As an example, Spread Networks is reported to have spent $350 million to connect Wall Street and Chicago with a fiber optic cable in order to reduce latency by 3 milliseconds. Even such a small reduction in the latency is worth several hundred million of dollars. Co-location allows HFT firms to locate their servers close to the exchanges' servers decreasing the time to access market data. The cost of a co-located server varies from $7,000/month to around three times that amount depending on whether the direct exchange feed is added or not (see Ding et al. (2014) ). The TABB group estimates that, for 2013, $1.5 billion has been invested in fast trading technologies. Some few papers have looked at that investment issue. Biais et al. (2015) find that because fast trading firms do not internalize the adverse selection costs they generate on slower trading firms, they overinvest in fast trading technologies. This overinvestment result also occurs in Pagnotta and Philippon (2015) and Budish at al. (2014) . The investment in fast trading technology is beyond the scope of our paper. However, our model shows that there is an optimal relative speed for fast traders. This optimal level naturally varies with both the number of fast and slow traders.
It increases with the number of slow traders and varies non-monotonically with the number of fast traders.
Once a certain level of latency has been put in place through some investment, HFTs use strategies to benefit from certain market conditions. The majority of HFT strategies are designed to profit from high liquidity and low volatility in the market. However, the strategies used by HFTs are heterogeneous and can be divided in two categories referred to as marketmaking strategies i.e. liquidity-providing strategies and opportunistic strategies i.e. statistical arbitrage strategies. However there is a concern that as HFT are not market makers and have no obligation to provide liquidity, they may strategically provide liquidity and therefore may not supply it when most needed. 3 Some of the focus of the literature has been to analyze the impact of the former strategies. Hagstromer and Norden (2013) find that most HFTs on the Nasdaq-OMX Stockholm use market-making strategies and alleviate intraday price volatility. Menkveld (2013) specifically focuses on one HFT market maker and finds that this HFT, broadly speaking, behaves as a market maker managing his inventory position. The rest of the empirical literature overwhelmingly shows that the presence of HFT has increased market quality (increased liquidity) by decreasing bid-ask spreads and contributing to price efficiency (see Brogaard et al. (2014) , Hendershott et al. (2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) , Brogaard (2010) and Menkveld (2014) to name but a few). Chabaud et al. (2014) also obtain that HFTs improve market efficiency by increasing liquidity and decreasing short term volatility. We confirm the finding on liquidity as we show that as the relative speed of the HFT increases, it augments the level of liquidity in the market. This has then a beneficial impact on liquidity traders as this increased liquidity leads to a reduction of their trading costs. However we prove that this result hinges on the presence of more than one HFT. Menkveld and Zoican (2016) shows that HFT may have a detrimental effect on the provision of liquidity and may reduce it. In their model, HFTs by being able to update their information faster and being able to trade on it reduce adverse selection in the market having a beneficial effect on liquidity. However, if their orders meet with High Frequency speculators, this may actually decrease liquidity. Whether the liquidity is positively or negatively affected depends on the security news to liquidity trader ratio. Further recent studies highlight the potential negative effect of the presence of HFTs such as the adverse selection effects brought by their presence (see for instance Biais at al. (2015) as explained above, see also Brogaard et al. (2014) ). Cartea and Penalva (2012) show that liquidity traders pay higher prices when buying and sell at lower prices when HFTs are present. Jain et al. (2016) show that the introduction of Arrowhead high-speed-trading platform on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, enabling high frequency trading, increases the exposure to systemic risk.
The profit obtained by HFT strategies has also been under scrutiny. HFTs benefit by arbitraging prices away and taking advantage of the difference in liquidity between distinct venues and have therefore gained from fragmented markets. HFTs earn a small amount of profit per trade, however given the number of trades they conduct per day their profit can be extremely large. Evidences have suggested a decline in the profitability of HFT. This may be the result of more competition and/or the result of the increased cost of fast trading. 4 We find that the 3 As an example of this strategic supply of liquidity, several HFTs ceased to provide liquidity during the Flash Crash of May 2010. Kirilenko et al. (2016) conclude that HFTs did not trigger the Flash Crash but contributed to it due to their response to the selling pressure.
4 See the Financial Times, February 13, 2013 and the New York Times, October 14, 2012 for evidences of both.
expected profit of HFT initially increases with their relative speed. However a large relative speed leads to lower expected profit. This can be explained as follows. When the number of times the HFT can trade N increases, fast informed traders compete more aggressively against each other. However, they are less affected by the competition from slow informed traders.
Hence, an intermediate speed optimally trades off the two effects and leads to an optimal level of speed. The effect of the HFT's relative speed onto slower traders is clearer. Both the number of HFTs and their relative speed have a negative impact on slower traders.
In summary, we prove the existence of a unique equilibrium with fast and slow traders.
We show that the presence of more than one HFT has a beneficial effect on liquidity and this benefits both liquidity traders and slow traders. However through the fact that slow traders trade on information and do not have the technology to react as fast as HFT, they are negatively affected. Because of their relatively slow speed, slow traders are limited in the use of their private information and this leads to slow traders being harmed by the presence of faster traders. This is captured by the fact that their expected profits are decreasing with the HFT's relative speed.
and the number of HFTs. This has important regulatory implications. If the regulator focuses on small investors with no information, then the presence of HFT is beneficial. As those traders benefit from higher liquidity leading to lower prices. However, if we look at the effect on more sophisticated traders still with no or very limited resources to invest in speed, the presence of HFT has a negative impact on these traders.
Our model is related to the following models as they are also based on the model of Kyle (1985) . Such models are Roşu (2016), Foucault et al. (2016) , Li (2017) . In Foucault et al. (2016) , only one informed trader is present and this trader is defined as the HFT. As a result of that assumption, the effect of the speed differential between traders cannot be analyzed. To the contrary Li (2017) 
The Model
We consider a risky security which is traded in a time interval which begins at t = 0 and ends at t = 1. At t = 1, the liquidation value of the asset is revealed. It is denoted byṽ, with
. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assumev = 0. We consider two types of informed traders some that have invested in a technology permitting high frequency trading and others that have not. Although interesting, we do not model this investment decision and leave it for future research. The fast and slow traders are defined as follows
• M 1 fast insiders (HFTs). At t = 0 they know the liquidation value perfectly. Each fast insider j submits orders. We denote ∆Y jn as the nth order submitted by the trader. It is assumed that the HFT can trade N times between t = 0 and t = 1. Let ∆t n be the time interval between the two consecutive orders and it is equal to ∆t n = 1 N . The fast trader can react to information faster than other informed traders and as a consequence trades more than slower traders. This trader benefits from low latency where low latency refers to the time it takes a trader to react to new information.
• M 2 slow insiders. At time t = 0, they observe the liquidation value. Each slow insider i, for i = 1, . . . , M 2 submits a unique order. It is assumed that it reaches the market at the same time as the N th order from the HFT. We denote that order by ∆X iN . This set up models the fact that the slow trader needs relatively more time to process his information and then to trade on it. With the aim of greatly simplifying the model we assume that they can only trade once just before the liquidation value is revealed.
The other two types of agents present in the market are now described
• Liquidity traders. There is a constant flow of orders from liquidity traders. Liquidity traders do not possess any information about the fundamental value of the risky asset.
We denote by ∆ũ n the aggregate order and we assume that ∆ũ n are independently and identically normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 u ∆t n . Also, we assume that ∆ũ n are independent ofṽ
• Competitive risk-neutral market makers. As in Foucault et al. (2016) , market makers continuously price the asset and set the price p n , for each trade n in a Bayesian way (as in Kyle (1985) ).
The number of times the asset can be traded between t = 0 and t = 1 is determined by the speed of the different traders. It is assumed that the HFT can trade the asset several times (N ) due to its speed. As a consequence, N can also be interpreted as the relative speed of the HFT or the HFT's speed advantage. In other words, N can be understood as how many more times the HFTs can trade relative to the slow traders. In that spirit, ∆t n can be interpreted as the time interval between the nth HFT's trade and the previous one, we assume that ∆t n = 1 N where N is the number of times the HFT can trade.
The two types of informed market participants are strategic. For each trade n, the fast traders determine their optimal trading strategy by a process of backward induction in order to maximize their expected profits from their last trade N to the current trade, the nth trade.
We look for a linear equilibrium where each informed trader chooses an order which is linear in his private information and the previous public price.
Competition in market making drives the market makers' expected profits to zero, conditional on the aggregate submitted ordersw n . We also look for linear strategies for the market makers.
In the next sections we provide the main results of our paper namely the proposition stating the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for the two case scenario under study: one HFT competing with one slow trader, and several HFTs competing with several slow traders.
However, in all scenarios liquidity traders are present. We first look at the benchmark case with one fast and one slow trader.
One Fast Trader and One Slow Trader
We now look for the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with one fast informed trader facing a unique slow insider.
The Equilibrium
In this section, we look for a linear equilibrium in which one HFT faces with one slow informed trader. We denote by ∆Y n the demand of the fast informed trader for his nth trade, for n = 1, . . . , N and we denote by ∆X N , the order submitted by the slow insider.
Competitive risk-neutral market makers continuously set the linear price. The aggregate order flow is given by w n = ∆Y n + ∆ũ n f or n < N,
It should be pointed out that when the slow trader trades the fast trader has traded several times. However, the slow trader only observes p 0 and the future liquidation value he received as private information before trading. This is due to the slow relative speed assumption.
The next proposition gives the form of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium in which the demand functions of both informed traders (HFT and slow trader) for each trade are:
The linear price, the error variance of prices and the expected profits are given respectively by:
For n < N the different coefficients are given as follows:
The boundary conditions at the last trade N are:
(3.13)
Proof: See Appendix.
After having established the existence, uniqueness and the equations of the equilibrium for our benchmark, we now turn to how the main performance measures of the market are affected by the presence of one HFT. We look at the effect of speed on the liquidity, informativeness and, finally, on expected profits of both HFTs and slow traders.
Liquidity
The liquidity parameter measures the adverse selection problem, in other words, the informational content of the order flow.
Numerical Result 1: Liquidity 1. Liquidity increases as a function of time however at an increasing rate.
2. Liquidity decreases with the relative speed or latency of the fast trader.
The first point in result 1 shows how the HFT exploits his information. He gradually uses his information so that his information is not incorporated into prices too early. As he gets closer to the end of the trading day he trades more on his private information.
The second point states that the adverse selection problem increases with the speed of the fast trader. In that case, the HFT being a monopolistic trader fully exploits his speed advantage. This can be understood by looking at the graph of how the HFT exploits his private information (β Y n ). As can be seen and as explained above, the trader gradually trades on his private information. Moreover, as the trader enjoys more speed the more intensely he trades on his private information later on the trading day. This result contradicts most of the results on the effect of speed on liquidity that show that liquidity increases with speed (see Brogaard et al. (2014) , Hendershott et al. (2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) , Brogaard (2010) and Menkveld (2014) ). However, a recent theoretical paper by Menkveld and Zoican (2016) shows that the above result may be changed depending on the security news to liquidity trader ratio. Our result is due to the assumption that only one trader has access to a technology giving a relative speed advantage.
The above result can be seen in Figure 1 of the Appendix. Figure 2 shows how the HFT gradually trades on information and accelerates his intensity towards the end of the trading day.
Informativeness and Volatility
Numerical Result 2: Price Informativeness
Price informativeness
1 Σn increases as a function of time.
2. The effect of the HFT's relative speed is non-monotonic.
As explained above, the fast trader has a monopolistic position for N − 1 of his orders among his N orders. He gradually trades on his long-lived private information which is, in turn, gradually incorporated into prices. As a consequence price efficiency increases.
It can be seen that the effect of speed on price efficiency is not monotonic. Higher relative speed implies that markets are less informationally efficient early on, and eventually reveal more information closer to the end of the trading day. Again this result depends on the fact that the HFT is monopolistic. This can be seen in Figure 3 of the Appendix.
Numerical Result 3: Volatility 1. Price volatility increases and then decreases as a function of time.
2. The effect on volatility of the HFT's relative speed is non-monotonic.
The above two points can be seen in Figure 4 . The effect of a single HFT on price volatility is not clear. The presence of one HFT leads to a build up in volatility as he faces no competition.
The competition with the slow trader leads to a decrease in volatility. An increase in the HFT's speed leads to more trade opportunities for the HFT however the effect of that increase on price volatility is non-monotonic.
Expected Profits
Numerical Result 4: Expected Profits 1. Provided N > 2, the expected profit of the fast trader increases with its speed, whereas the expected profit of the slow trader decreases with the speed of the HFT.
2. The fast trader always obtains higher expected profits than the slow trader.
As previously commented upon, the HFT enjoys a monopolistic position and the greater its speed the more he can exploit that position. Not surprisingly, its expected profits are then increasing with its speed. Because the HFT's speed strengthens its monopolistic position, it has a detrimental effect on the slow trader. Once the slow trader can trade, most of his private information which is shared with the HFT has been incorporated into prices. As the speed of the HFT increases more of the private information is revealed in prices and the less scope the slow trader can benefit from his private information. This then leads to decreasing expected profits of the slow trader with the speed of the HFT and to the slow trader's expected profit being lower than the fast trader's. In that case, higher relative speed only benefits HFTs. Indeed, the decrease in liquidity due to the increase in relative speed of the HFT makes all other market participants worse off (apart from the market makers as their expected profits are equal to zero).
This result makes a stronger case for the regulation of high frequency trading.
The above statements can be seen in Figures 17 and 19 of the Appendix. The reader can refer to the curve where M 1 = M 2 = 1.
We now look at the more general case where M 1 ≥ 1 several fast traders compete between each other as well as compete against M 2 ≥ 1 slow traders.
The Equilibrium
Similarly to the previous section, we denote by ∆Y jn the demand of the jth fast informed trader for the nth order, for j = 1, . . . , M 1 and for n = 1, . . . , N . The aggregate nth orders stemming from the fast insiders are denoted by
∆Y jn = ∆Y n . We denote by ∆X iN , the order submitted by the ith slow insider for i = 1, . . . , M 2 . The aggregate orders from slow insiders are denoted
The market makers behave as before. The aggregate order flow is given by
Using a symmetry argument, it is straightforward to show that, at the equilibrium, all informed traders of the same type have an identical strategy. Also, the demand of the ith slow
) and the demand for the nth order of the jth fast insider is
As before, although the slow traders trade at the last auction they are trading on the knowledge of p 0 and their private information.
The following proposition states the linear equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 There exists a unique linear equilibrium such that
The demands by strategic traders are given by
(4.14)
The price is given by
We then have the following
The boundary conditions are given by:
(4.26)
We use an explicit method introducing variable q n = α n λ n in order to solve the system in Proposition 4.2. The method is described in what follows and used for the numerical experiments.
The solution of the system in Proposition 4.2 is given by starting from q N = 0 and iterating backward for q N −1 , q N −2 ..., q 1 by using the root of the following cubic equation which lies in
.
where for instants n = 1, ..., N − 1,
and for instant n = N (last auction),
Proposition 4.4 Let q n = α n λ n . The parameters are calculated by starting from Σ 0 and iterating forward for the following variables in the order listed for instant n = 1, ..., N − 1
In what follows, we focus on the properties of our general model in terms of liquidity, informativeness and profits during the two phases of our trading game: a phase (early auctions until the penultimate one) where only the fast trader is active as opposed to the phase (last auction)
where both insiders are active.
Liquidity
Numerical Result 5: Liquidity
2. Liquidity increases with the speed of fast traders.
3. The effect of the number of HFTs depends on the number of HFTs. If there are more than 1 HFTs, increasing their number will increase liquidity. The effect of the slow traders is not as clear.
Ceteris paribus, we obtain that liquidity increases over time and this can be seen in all the figures representing the liquidity (from Figures 5 to 8 in the Appendix). This is due to the fact that as time gets closer to the end of the trading day, more information has been revealed decreasing the asymmetry of information between informed traders and market makers.
The second point states that the speed of the HFTs is beneficial to market quality as more speed increases the liquidity of the market. When the speed increases, competing HFTs trade more aggressively early on, thereby revealing more information quickly and improving market liquidity for later auctions. This can be seen in Figure 5 of the Appendix.
In such a model most of the competition comes from the early HFTs trades. The above result tells us that the more HFTs compete, the better the level of liquidity (this can be seen in Figure 6 ).
The two last results, described above, echo the overwhelming finding in the literature that the presence of HFTs increases liquidity in markets by decreasing bid-ask spreads (see Brogaard et al. (2014) , Hendershott et al. (2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) , Brogaard (2010) and Menkveld (2014) ). However, a recent theoretical paper by Menkveld and Zoican (2016) shows that the above result maybe changed depending on the security news to liquidity trader ratio. Interestingly, it can be seen from Figure 6 , that the liquidity for early trades is not monotonic with the number of fast traders. It initially decreases with the number leading to the fact that a market with a single HFT is more liquid early on than any other markets with, given our parameters configuration, a number of competing HFTs between 2 and 9. This can be explained by the strategic behavior of the HFTs trying to "smooth" their information revelation by gradually trading on their private information.
Informativeness and Volatility
Numerical Result 6: Price Informativeness
Price informativeness
1 Σn increases with time.
2. Price informativeness also increases with the number of fast traders and their relative speed.
This result shows that the competition between fast traders leads them to reveal their information at the earlier auctions. They anticipate more competition in the future and as a result trade more aggressively early on. Therefore, most of the informativeness of prices is provided by the fast traders as when the slow traders trade most of their private information has been revealed. The two points can be seen in Figure 13 in the Appendix.
As can be seen from Figure 14 , the effect of slow traders on price efficiency is very small. This is due to the fact that once their orders reach the market most of their private information has been already incorporated into prices.
Numerical Result 7: Volatility
The evolution of price volatility over time depends on the number of slow traders, the number of HFTs and their relative speed.
1. Price volatility may be decreasing or increasing with the HFTs' speed.
2. Price volatility increases with the number of slow traders whereas it is non-monotonic with the number of HFTs.
The above statements can be seen Figures 15 and 16 . It is always the case that slow traders see their expected profit decrease with the investment in the fast technology despite the fact that liquidity is increased by higher relative speed (see Numerical result 8 and 9 may help us understand the recent findings that HFTs have seen their profit reduced. Given our results it may be due to more and more traders investing in fast technology and leading to more competition and/or to a suboptimal investment in fast technology.
Expected Profits

Policy Implications
Comparing the two models can help us draw some policy implications.
In the benchmark, we find that liquidity decreases with the relative speed of HFTs whereas we obtain the opposite result when there are strictly more than one HFT. We also find that the effect of relative speed on price volatility is not clear. Relative speed may increase volatility as we get closer to the time where the HFT competes with the slower trader. These observations can help with the regulation of HFTs. Looking at liquidity, any type of regulation that promotes competition between HFTs such as increasing their number will have a beneficial effect. This can be achieved in different ways. Some of the discussions have focused directly on the speed of HFTs and have proposed a speed limit to decrease their speed advantage. A speed limit is a proposition put forward by EBS, one of the two dominant platforms in the foreign exchange market. 5 This can be achieved in different ways. The proposition of EBS is to batch orders together and execute them in a random way. Another proposition from regulators in Australia and Europe is to impose resting periods. The discussion around the creation of the IEX stock market is also relevant and interesting. This market has been created as a response to the perception that speed gives an unfair advantage to the market participants who benefit from it. The IEX does not allow traders to co-locate their servers close to the market's servers. A delay of some fraction of a second is artificially added up to eliminate the speed advantage of some HF traders. Opposite to that, some markets allow the traders to co-locate their servers close to the market's servers with same cable length for all traders. This effectively leads to the same speed for obtaining information across the traders with servers co-located close to the market's servers. Other propositions have been to implement a fee structure directed at HFTs.
For instance, the Moscow Exchange is looking at implementing fees that would apply to traders using many small orders (this is a feature of HFTs). In China, a limit on the number of trades in Futures markets has been implemented. Traders can trade in the same instrument up to 500 times a day. This puts a significant limit in the number of trades HFTs can execute. 
Conclusion
In the following paper we analyze the effect of HFT on markets. We define a HFT as being a trader that benefits from low latency and as such can trade on information much faster than a slow trader. We adapt the model from Kyle (1985) to allow traders to be able to trade at different speeds. We prove the existence and the unicity of the equilibrium with fast and slow traders. We derive a benchmark model where one HFT competes against one slow trader. We then generalize our results to the case where several HFTs compete against each other as well as against several slow traders.
We get the following results. In the benchmark, we obtain that the liquidity decreases with the relative speed of the HFTs. This leads to the fact that all other traders, except market makers, are made worse off by the presence of the HFT. We also obtain that the effect of the presence of the HFT on price volatility is not clear. For the general case, we prove that the higher speed from some traders improves liquidity and price efficiency. We also find that speed is beneficial to HFTs as higher speed leads to the fact that they earn higher expected profits than slower traders. Higher speed increases the scope to use their private information. Furthermore, we obtain that speed has a detrimental effect on slow traders. The faster HFTs can trade the lower the slower traders' expected profits. This happens despite the fact that liquidity increases with speed. This is due to the fact that the higher the speed of the HFTs the more they can trade on their private information leading to the fact that when slower traders can trade most of their private information has already been incorporated into prices. This echoes Baer and Patterson (2014) stating that higher speed from some traders gives them an unfair advantage. Finally, we obtain that the HFTs' expected profits are initially increasing with their speed advantage.
This speed advantage dissipates for higher speed and their expected profits decrease with speed.
This suggests an optimal level of latency. Overall price volatility is improved by the competition between HFTs and their relative speed.
Our results show that the improved liquidity (seen in the general case) will not benefit all market participants. An improved liquidity will reduce the losses by liquidity traders. Slower informed traders do not benefit from this improved liquidity as their expected profits decrease with the HFTs' latency.
Our paper also recommends more competition in HF trading as this may improve liquidity.
Regarding price volatility, any policy recommendations are difficult to make.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
This is proved by setting M 1 = M 2 = 1 in Proposition 2 and the following the exact same steps as in Proposition 2.
Proof of the Proposition 2
We look for a linear equilibrium. The fast insiders determine for each of their orders the one that optimizes their expected profits given their conjectures about the both fast and slow traders' strategies.
The linear equilibrium implies that the price set for the nth order flow by the risk-neutral market makers is: p n = p n−1 + λ n w n .
For n < N , the fast traders are the only informed market participants. We conjecture the linear strategy played by the jth fast trader for his nth order:
whereṽ is his private information (the liquidation value of the risky asset). Since all the insiders receive the same information at time t = 0, by using a symmetric argument their strategies are identical at the equilibrium. Therefore, we suppress the "j" subscript from the reaction β jn and the expected profit π jn of the jth fast informed trader. One can then consider the profit of this jth fast informed trader which is realized for the nth order, and what remains to be gained from the next order to the end of trading. This is given below:
We have
where ∆Y * is the sum of the orders submitted at the same time by the M 1 −1 other fast informed traders.
By considering thatũ n andṽ are independent and that E(ũ) = 0, we obtain:
On the other hand, we have:
This leads to:
Considering the first order condition of the above maximization problem leads to:
At the equilibrium, all insiders submit identical orders since they have received the same information leading to ∆Y * = (M − 1)∆Y jn . Hence at the equilibrium we find:
We then identify the reaction of the jth fast informed trader to his private information and to the previous price for his nth order:
Finally, the second order condition yields to:
On the other hand, the market efficiency condition implies that λ n is the regression coefficient ofṽ onw n conditional onw 1 , . . . ,w n , in other words:
λ n = cov(ṽ,w n ) |w 1 ...,w n−1 var(w n ) |w 1 ...,w n−1 .
By developing, we obtain:
We now calculate the variance of error prices for the nth order Σ n :
var(ṽ|w 1 , . . . ,w n−1 ) .
We derive the following expressions of Σ n and λ n respectively:
Finally, for determining the relationship between α Y n and α Y n−1 as well as between δ Y n and δ Y n−1 we substitute the expression of ∆Y jn into the fast trader's expected profit. We then obtain:
Thus, we have:
We now determine the demand of the insiders at the last auction n = N .
The ith slow informed trader chooses his demand ∆X iN that maximizes his profit knowing his information that he receives at time t = 0, that is to say, his private signalṽ and the public price p 0 . Therefore his maximization problem is:
with p N = ∆X iN +∆X * +∆Y N +∆ũ N and where ∆X * represents the aggregate orders submitted by the (M 2 −1) other low informed traders and ∆Y N is the sum of the orders of the fast informed traders. Moreover at n = 0, all insiders even slow traders observe the realization v of the lawṽ.
As the market is efficient, all prices information, including the realization of the law p (N −1) , is contained by v.
The first order condition implies that:
At the equilibrium the slow informed traders submit the same orders, in other words ∆X * = (M 2 − 1)∆X iN . Hence the first order condition is given by:
The jth fast informed trader solves the following maximization problem:
This can be rewritten as
with ∆Y * being the aggregate orders submitted by the (M 1 − 1) other fast informed traders and ∆X N the aggregate orders of the slow informed traders.
This leads to,
The first order condition is given by:
At the equilibrium we have ∆Y * = (M 1 − 1)∆Y jN . We also obtain the order of the jth fast informed trader:
In sum, we have:
This system of equations implies that:
On the other hand, the error variance of price at the final auction is:
The liquidity parameter is given by:
Since ∆X iN = ∆Y jN for all i = 1, . . . , M 2 and j = 1, . . . , M 1 , we have that β X N = β Y N ∆t N and the following relationships:
The boundary conditions give:
Proof of Proposition 4.3
For instants n = 1, ..., N − 1, define q n = α n λ n .By multiplying the expression of α n−1 by λ n−1 we have:
implying that:
We also have:
By replacing the expression the expression of the Betas, we have:
Finally we have:
thus:
Hence the cubic equations:
For instant n=N, define q N = α N λ N .By multiplying the expression of α N −1 by λ N −1 we have:
and:
It remains to be shown that the only root of the cubic equation which makes economic sense lies in [0, 1 2 ). The second order condition gives q n < 1. The cubic equation may be rewritten as:
Let's suppose that q n ∈ [0, 1 2 ), we have:
, and:
, 1]. with:
We also have: 
